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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

in addition to the process server's due diligence, the court was satisfied
that the defendants were a party to the deception. Special cognizance
was taken of the receptionist's role: "[A process server] has the right
to assume that corporate employees whose duties include meeting and
guiding visitors will act honestly and cooperatively."3 0
It is difficult to disagree with a decision that places ultimate
responsibility on a corporation for the misconduct of its employees.
It should be noted, however, that a decision such as Belofatto must
achieve a delicate balance between countervailing equities. On one
hand, there is the danger that sustaining improper service will lead
to carelessness and increase the risk of default by the purported recipient.3 1 On the other hand, exacting compliance with CPLR 311 might
invite corporate defendants "to engage in deceptive maneuvers designed to mislead the process server and to defeat justice." 32 Hence, of
necessity, general rules cannot be propounded; exceptions must be
carefully carved out in special situations.3 3 Nonetheless, it is hoped
that in the future more decisions will be tempered by the sense of
fairness pervading the Belofatto outcome.
CPLR 320(b): Conduct inconsistent with a desire to raise jurisdictional
objection deemed an appearance.
If process or its service is insufficient to provide the court with
personal jurisdiction, such jurisdiction will nonetheless be secured if
the defendant makes an appearance.3 4 Under CPLR 320(a), defendant
appears "by serving an answer, or a notice of appearance, or by making
a motion which has the effect of extending the time to answer." In
Rizika v. Board of Assessors,35 it was conceded that service of a petition
to review a tax assessment by mail, instead of by personal delivery as
required by statute, 36 was improper.37 And, the recipient had not taken
38
any action which would constitute an appearance under GPLR 320(a).
30 Id. at 924, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
31 McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 116, 238 N.E.2d 726, 728, 291
N.Y.S.2d 328, 882 (1968).
32 Belofatto v. Marsen Realty Corp., 62 Misc. 2d 922, 924, 310 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
33 One important factor in Belofatto was that the statute of limitations was about to
expire when service was effected, and the court was of the opinion that a dismissal of
the complaint would deprive plaintiff of his day in court. Id. Accord, 7B MCKiNNEY's CPLR
205, supp. commentary at 49 (1964).
34 CPLR 320(b): " . . unless an objection to jurisdiction under paragraph eight of
subdivision (a) of rule 8211 is asserted by motion or in an answer as provided in rule 3211:'
35 62 Misc. 2d 774, 810 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1970).
36 REAL PROp. TAX LAW § 708 (McKinney 1960).
37 See Pennington v. Board of Assessors, 34 Misc. 2d 36, 227 N.YS.2d 964 (Sup. Ct.
Jefferson County 1962).
38 Usually, a defendant must make an appearance in order to avoid a default judg-
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Nevertheless, a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was denied on
the ground that respondent had already appeared in the action.
In reaching this conclusion, the court examined respondent's conduct from the time it received the petition until the trial was ordered
and found, essentially, that it was inconsistent with any desire to object
to jurisdiction. 39 Mindful, perhaps, that whether or not respondent
had in fact appeared was at least arguable, 40 the court solidified its
position by adding that "any court appearance without a motion... is
a waiver of any objection to jurisdiction of the person." 41
In view of the peculiar facts presented in Rizika, the court was
justified in holding that respondent had waived its jurisdictional
objection. Nevertheless, the language in the opinion to the effect that
any appearance constitutes a waiver should not be read as illustrative
of a universal truism; by statute, certain courses of action which will
not constitute an appearance conferring personal jurisdiction are prescribed. Specifically, a "restrictive" appearance is provided in CPLR
302(b) 42; a "limited" appearance is found in CPLR 320(c) 43 ; and, no
appearance is made when a defendant moves under sections 3012(b),
6222 or 6223 of the CPLR. It should be noted, however, that earlier
cases recognized what is known as an informal appearance, 44 and there
is no indication that these holdings have been abrogated by the
CPLR.45 Thus, while Rizika serves to remind the practitioner that an
objection to jurisdiction should be raised as soon as possible, its overly
broad language must be read in the light of the above considerations.
ment. H. WAcHTELL, NEW YoRK PRAcnrIc

UNDmt THE CPLR 48 (3d ed. 1970). However,

the peculiar facts in Rizika arose because the Real Property Tax Law § 712(ii) does not
require an answer, i.e., a responsive pleading under 3211(e).
39 The petition was mailed on August 22, 1968. On the return date, special term
transferred the proceedings to the general calendar at respondent's request. In March
1969, the proceeding was reached for trial, respondent objecting to an erroneous note
of issue, but not to the insufficiency of original service. Subsequent attempts to adjust
the assessment proved futile, and when trial was ordered in January 1970, respondent,
for the first time, asserted that the original service was improper.
40The Real Property Tax Law makes no provision as to what acts constitute an
appearance. Hence, this determination was governed by the CPLR, see CPLR 103(b), and
respondent had not done anything which would constitute an appearance under
CPLR 320(a).
4162 Misc. 2d at 777, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 46.

42Although the defendant appears and defends an action where jurisdiction is
predicated on the long-arm statute, he does not subject himself to personal jurisdiction
as to any cause of action not arising from one of the acts enumerated in CPLR 302.
H. WACHTELL, NEv YoRK PRAcrIcE UNDER THE CPLR 32 (3d ed. 1970).
43 This subdivision, as amended, restores the limited appearance to New York practice where the sole basis of jurisdiction is an attachment levy upon the defendant's property.
It is written to codify the holding of Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d
319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968). See generally 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 320, supp. commentary
at 228-34 (1969).
44 See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 247 N.Y. 428, 160 N.E. 775 (1928).
45 See H. PErERR UND & J. MCLAUGHLIN, NEw YoRK PRAcricE 377 (2d ed. 1968).

